Editorials

Right-to-Work: Seventh Circuit Splits 5-5 on Rehearing Sweeney v. Pence

Benjamin Sachs

Benjamin Sachs is the Kestnbaum Professor of Labor and Industry at Harvard Law School and a leading expert in the field of labor law and labor relations. He is also faculty director of the Center for Labor and a Just Economy. Professor Sachs teaches courses in labor law, employment law, and law and social change, and his writing focuses on union organizing and unions in American politics. Prior to joining the Harvard faculty in 2008, Professor Sachs was the Joseph Goldstein Fellow at Yale Law School.  From 2002-2006, he served as Assistant General Counsel of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in Washington, D.C.  Professor Sachs graduated from Yale Law School in 1998, and served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Stephen Reinhardt of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. His writing has appeared in the Harvard Law Review, the Yale Law Journal, the Columbia Law Review, the New York Times and elsewhere.  Professor Sachs received the Yale Law School teaching award in 2007 and in 2013 received the Sacks-Freund Award for Teaching Excellence at Harvard Law School.  He can be reached at [email protected].

The seventh circuit yesterday denied appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc in Sweeney v. Pence, a case involving the legality of Indiana’s right-to-work law. But the vote on the petition was 5-5: Judges Posner, Rovner, Wood, Williams, and Hamilton dissented from the denial “for the reasons stated in Chief Judge Wood’s dissent to the panel opinion.” Despite the outcome here, the vote is an indication that there is now substantial support for the proposition that right-to-work laws like Indiana’s are preempted by federal labor law. Judge Wood’s dissent can be found here. Catherine Fisk and I filed an amicus brief urging rehearing in Sweeney, and we summarized the preemption argument as follows:

In a forthcoming article, we conclude that right-to-work laws like Indiana’s are preempted by federal law to the extent they prohibit collective bargaining agreements that require nonmembers to pay less than union dues and fees. See Catherine Fisk & Benjamin Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right to Work Laws, 4 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 859, 862-68 (2014).  The National Labor Relations Act broadly preempts state laws regulating union-management relations and provides the exclusive source of law governing the interpretation and validity of collective bargaining agreements. See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95 (1962); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). With the limited exception to preemption of section 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), the validity of fair share fee provisions of collective bargaining agreements is governed exclusively by federal law. Section 14(b) saves from preemption only state laws invalidating agreements requiring nonmembers to pay the same as is required of members. To the extent that Indiana Code § 22-6-6-8 invalidates collective agreements requiring nonmembers to pay less than is required of members, it is not within the section 14(b) savings provision. Accordingly, this Court should grant the petition for rehearing en banc and hold that federal labor law preempts the Indiana right-to-work law.

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